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The Right of an Indigent Defendant to an Inter-
preter in a Civil Trial: Jara v. Municipal Court
The gradual recognition of a constitutional right of indigent criminal
defendants to the assistance of qualified interpreters at state expense has
been the focus of much attention in recent years.' In Jara v. Municipal
Court,2 California became the first jurisdiction to address this issue in the
context of a civil adjudication. Aurelio Jara, an indigent defendant who
spoke little English, filed for a writ of mandamus after a municipal court
judge denied his request for a court-appointed interpreter to assist him
during trial. In a 4-3 decision, the California Supreme Court refused to
provide Jara with an interpreter at state expense, rejecting his claim that
denial of an interpreter would violate his constitutional rights to due
process and equal protection of the laws. Though the majority addressed
the due process issue only cursorily, completely omitting any discussion of
equal protection, the dissenting justices, in a strong opinion by Justice
Tobriner, indicated that they would uphold Jara's right to an interpreter
on both grounds. The case provides an interesting vehicle to examine
systematically the claim of an indigent civil defendant to a court-appointed
interpreter according to the formulas, tests, and analytical methods by
which questions of procedural due process and equal protection are
traditionally resolved.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES OF DUE
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
An examination of the development of the doctrines of procedural
due process and equal protection provides a useful background to an
analysis of the constitutional issues presented in Jara. This section will
briefly review the analytical methods applied by the courts to determine the
requisites of due process and equal protection and then explore in greater
depth those components that lay the foundation for the recognition of a
defendant's constitutional right to an interpreter in a civil action.
A. Fundamentals of Due Process
1. The Search to Determine What Process is Due
It is well established that the doctrine of procedural due process,
imposed upon the federal and state judicial systems by the fifth3 and
1. See Annot., 36 A.L.R. 3d 276 (1971).
2. 21 Cal. 3d 181, 578 P.2d 94, 145 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 833 (1979).
3. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part: "No person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . ."
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fourteenth4 amendments, requires, at a minimum, that "deprivation of life,
liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and an
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case."5 The
opportunity to be heard, revered as the fundamental requisite of due
process of law, 6 must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.7 Yet the identification of the procedural safeguards that comprise
a meaningful opportunity to be heard requires an individual examination
in each case, for the procedural requisites for the hearing vary with the
subject matter and the necessities of the situation,8 as well as with the
characteristics and handicaps of the one who is entitled to such rights.9
In determining the procedural protections required by the due process
clause, the United States Supreme Court has traditionally looked to
established rules, principles, and modes of proceeding, 1° the dictates of
natural law," and the requirements of fundamental fairness. 2 A balancing
approach, in which the interests of the state are weighed against the
4. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part: "(N]or shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law..,."
5. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
6. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914).
7. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
8. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84 (1909). See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481
(1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971). In Boddie the Court recognized:
What the Constitution does require is "an opportunity . . . granted at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner" (citation omitted) "for [a] hearing appropriate to the nature of
the case." (citation omitted) The formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary,
depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent
proceedings.
The Moyer doctrine that constitutional due process requirements are dependent upon the
circumstances of a particular case was recognized by the California Supreme Court in Sokol v. Public
Utilities Commission, 65 Cal. 2d 247, 254, 418 P.2d 265, 270, 53 Cal. Rptr. 673, 678 (1966), a case
concerning the right to a hearing prior to termination of telephone service for illegal activity, in which
the court stated: "[The] content [of due process] is a function of many variables, including the nature of
the right affected, the degree of danger caused by the proscribed condition or activity, and tile
availability of prompt remedial measures."
9. See Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956) (Since town officials knew that taxpayer
was mentally incompetent and unable to understand the nature of tile proceedings against her
property, compliance with statutory notice procedures without the protection of a guardian does not
afford notice to the incompetent, and a taking under such circumstances would be without due process
of law.).
10. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,733 (1878),
overruled on other grounds in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) ("[Due process of law] mean[s] a
course of legal proceedings according to those rules and principles which have been established in our
systems of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights.").
11. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTITUTIONAL LAW 532 (1978). See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78, 106 (1908).
12. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Solesbee v. Balkeom, 339 U.S. 9,16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting),
in which Justice Frankfurter writes:
It is now the settled doctrine of this court that the Due Process Clause embodies a system of
rights based on moral principles so deeply embedded in the traditions and feelings of our
people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our whole history.
Due process is that which comports with the deepest notion of what is fair and right andjust,
The more fundamental the beliefs are the less likely they are to be explicitly stated. But respect
for them is of the very essence of the Due Process Clause. In enforcing them this Court does
not translate personal views into constitutional limitations. In applying such a large,
untechnical concept as "due process," the Court enforces those permanent and pervasive
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individual interests sought to be protected, has long been utilized by the
Court as a part of any determination of the form of hearing required in
particular situations by procedural due process. 13 Professor Tribe has
observed that it is only recently, however, that "overtly utilitarian interest-
balancing has come to play a predominant role."' 4 This trend culminated
in the decision of Mathews v. Eldridge, 15 a case concerning the necessity of
an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of Social Security benefits,
in which the United States Supreme Court was explicit in setting forth a
general formula to be applied in determining what process is due:
Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures
provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the
governmental and private interests that are affected. . . .More precisely,
our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due
process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.'6
Expanding on the implementation of these factors, the Court noted
that "[a]t some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the
individual affected .. .and to society in terms of increased assurance
that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost."'17 Following the
Eldridge decision, the Court held in Bounds v. Smith 8 that while "the cost
of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total denial," 9
economic factors may be considered in choosing the methods to
implement that right. Thus, the Court has indicated that considerations of
cost will be a factor in deciding "exactly what level of protection a right
should receive.,
20
feelings of our society as to which there is compelling evidence of the kind relevant to
judgments on social institutions.
13. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,570 (1972). See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
14. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 540.
15. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
16. Id. at 33435 (citations omitted). The factors listed were presented in the context of a
determination of the constitutionality of administrative procedures. Nevertheless, there is nothing in
the manner in which they have been presented which indicates that they are to be given such limited
applicability, and in fact they are treated by two recent commentators as having a general application,
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 502 (1978) (Hereinafter cited as
NowAK]; TRIBE, supra note 11, at 540. Certainly, their application has not been limited to factual
patterns similar to Eldridge, for the Eldridge factors were subsequently applied in Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977), in which the Court held a child's due process liberty interest did not require
the protection of notice and hearing prior to the imposition of corporal punishment by a teacher.
17. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
18. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
19. Id. at 825.
20. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 541.
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2. Recognition of a Due Process Right to Cross-examine as
an Element of a Meaningful Hearing
Although the procedural requisites of a meaningful hearing vary
according to the necessities of each individual case and the competing
interests concerned, the importance of the right to cross-examine has
increasingly been recognized as a fundamental safeguard and a basic
element of a due process hearing. In Greene v. McElroy,2 the United
States Supreme Court observed:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our
jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously
injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact
findings, the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed
to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While
this is important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even more
important where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose
memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons
motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. We
have formalized these protections in the requirements oF confrontation and
cross-examination.2
21. 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (suit by an aeronautical engineer whose employment was terminated
following a denial of his security clearance). The Court held that, absent explicit authorization from
either the President or Congress, the Secretaries of the Armed Forces were not authorized to deprive
the petitioner of his job in a proceeding in which he was not afforded the safeguard of confrontation
and cross-examination.
22. Id. at 496-97. In reaching these conclusions, the Court found support in Professor Wigmore's
observation that in Anglo-American law, confrontation and cross-examination are basic ingredients of
a fair trial. 5 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE oN EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940). The Court quoted from
Wigmore's text as follows:
For two centuries past, the policy of the Anglo-American system of Evidence has been to
regard the necessity of testing by cross-examination as a vital feature of the law. The belief
that no safeguard for testing the value of human statements is comparable to that furnished
by cross-examination, and the conviction that no statement (unless by special exception)
should be used as testimony until it has been probed and sublimated by that test, has found
increasing strength in lengthening experience.
360 U.S. at 497. Greene and the cases discussed below pertaining to this topic deal with the right of
cross-examination as a requirement of due process in the context of administrative hearings rather
than civil trials. However, the requirement appears to be equally fundamental as an element of due
process in the latter. While both criminal actions and administrative hearings of the nature discussed In
the relevant cases share as a common element the fact that a governmental body is the opposing party,
this does not appear central to the rationale of the Greene decision or the cases discussed below,
Rather, the focus of these cases is on the fairness of the proceeding, requiring the most effective of
procedural safeguards against false or perjured testimony that could cause serious injury to an
individual. The Court's reliance upon Wigmore's recognition of confrontation and cross-examination
as basic ingredients of a fair trial further supports this position.
Rather than suggesting the existence of a fundamental distinction which requires due process
rights at a governmental administrative hearing that are not recognized at a civil trial, lack of authority
recognizing a due process right to confrontation in a civil trial is most probably explained by the
absence of the need to litigate the issue in the context of a civil trial, where the opportunity for cross-
examination has long been provided. See 81 AM. JUR. 2d Witnesses §§ 464,467 (1976). It has been only
with the growth of modern bureaucracies and the increasing adjudicatory powers given to
governmental agencies (a trend that has accompanied the recognition of new property rights, see
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964)) that the need has arisen to litigate so frequently the
question of which of the procedural safeguards traditionally provided in judicial proceedings were
required as elements of due process and therefore must similarly be provided in adjudications by
administrative bodies. See generally Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420,442 (1960), in which the United
States Supreme Court stated:
"Due process" is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content
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These findings were reaffirmed and quoted with approval in Goldberg v.
Kelly,23 a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that welfare
recipients must be given an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses relied on by the department prior to termination of benefits. The
Court found that "[i]n almost every setting where important decisions turn
on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses. 24 Although, as with any due process
safeguard, serious countervailing interests and consequences of adjudica-
tion that are not of great significance may dictate that in a given instance
this right should be not implemented, 25 the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses has continued to be recognized as a basic and
minimum requirement of a due process hearing.
26
3. The Existence of a Due Process Right to Be Present
It is generally recognized that a party to a civil action who is not in
default is entitled to be present in the courtroom at all stages of his trial.27
This right reaches constitutional dimensions both through the guarantees
of the due process clause28 and the right to trial by jury 29 secured by the
seventh amendment to the United States Constitution3 and by the state
constitutions.31 In the most recent case that deals with this issue,
varies according to specific factual contexts. Thus, when governmental agencies adjudicate or
make binding determinations which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is
imperative that those agencies use the procedures which have traditionally been associated
with the judicial process.
23. 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970).
24. Id. at 269. Similarly, in Willner v. Committee on Characterand Fitness,373 U.S. 96 (1963),
in which the Court held that Petitioner was denied procedural due process when he was denied
admission to the bar without a hearing on the charges against him, it was recognized by the Court that
procedural due process often requires confrontation and cross-examination of those whose word
deprives a person of his livelihood.
25. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,567 (1974) (in which the Court found that the heavy
threat of havoc inside the prison and the special concerns of prison administration outweighed the
interests of prisoners in being allowed cross-examination at their disciplinary hearings).
26. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972) (in which the Court held that the
minimum requirements ofdue process at a parole revocation hearing included the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses); 81 Am. JUR. 2d Witnesses § 464 (1976).
27. 75 Ala. JuR. 2d Trial § 51 (1974). See Whaley v. State, 263 Ala. 191, 82 So. 2d 187 (1955);
Willingham v. Willingham, 192 Ga. 405, 15 S.E.2d 514 (1941); Koeppel v. Koeppel, 208 S.W.2d 929
(Mo. App. 1948); Carlislev. Countyof Nassau, 64 App. Div. 2d 15,408 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1978); Leonard's
of Plainfield v. Dybas, 130 NJ.L. 135,31 A.2d 496 (1943); Harringtonv. Decker, 134 Vt. 259,356 A.2d
511 (1976).
28. Leonard's of Plainfield v. Dybas, 130 N.J.L. 135,137-38,31 A.2d 496,497 (1943); Carlislev.
County of Nassau, 64 App. Div. 2d 15, 18 408 N.Y.S. 2d 114, 116 (1978).
29. Carlisle v. County of Nassau, 64 App. Div. 2d 15,18-19,408 N.Y.S.2d 114,116 (1978 1[Tjhe
fundamental constitutional right ofa person to have ajury trial in certain civil cases includes therein the
ancillary right to be present at all stages of such a trial, except deliberations of the jury (citation
omitted)."); Harrington v. Decker, 134 Vt. 259, 261, 356 A.2d 511, 512 (1976). Both of these cases
involve the absence of a party during the selection of the jury.
30. The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law."
31. Carlisle v. County of Nassau, 64 App. Div. 2d 15, 18, 408 N.Y.S.2d 114, 116 (1978)
("Although the right to trial by jury contained in the Federal Constitution does not bind the states, or
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Carlisle v. County of Nassau,32 the New York Appellate Court found that
the right of a party- to be present at all stages of a trial is "basic to due
process of law." The court in Carlisle explicitly recognized that this right is
not forfeited when a party is represented by counsel.
33
The California Supreme Court has also recently given some
recognition to the right of a party to be present at trial in dicta in Payne v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County.34 In determining the rights of a
prisoner to attend a trial in which he is a civil defendant or to have
appointed counsel or both, the court noted that one approach, to accord
the prisoner the right of personal appearance to defend any action, and to
employ counsel if able to do so, would place the indigent prisoner in the
same position as the indigent free person. 5
Although the right to be present has, as indicated above, gained
substantial recognition, it has not received the widespread recognition and
discussion in case law that other due process safeguards have invoked.
Perhaps the reason for the absence of numerous cases defending the right
of a party to be present in the courtroom results from an absence of the
need to litigate the issue. Traditionally, civil trials in the United States are
operate as a limitation upon them, similar provisions (as in the seventh amendment) are found In all
state constitutions and all have the same purpose (citation omitted).").
32. 64 App. Div. 2d 15, 18, 408 N.Y.S.2d 114, 116 (1978).
33. The Court stated:
The suggestion of defendant that a party somehow forfeits his constitutional right to be
present at any and all stages of the trial when represented by counsel has no basis either in law
or in logic. Waiver of the right to be present at a particular stage of the trial must be strictly
construed (Arrington v. Robertson, 3 Cir., 114 F.2d 821). Although a party may not act in
person at the trial of the action when represented by an attorney, except by consent of the
court (CPLR 321, subd [a]), his right not only to be an interested and concerned observer ofa
proceeding which ultimately affects him, but to help plan and plot trial strategy is in no way
denigrated by the presence of retained orassigned counsel. The attorney is not the alterego of
his client, but his representative or agent. As such he may not supplant the client either at his
or the court's unbridled pleasure.
64 App. Div. 2d 15, 19, 408 N.Y.S. 2d 114. 117 (1978).
Carlisle, Leonard's of Plainfield, and AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE rely in part on earlier federal
cases, Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S. 76 (1919), and Arringtonv, Robertson, 114 F,2d 821
(3rd Cir. 1940). Both of these eases involve the absence of both the party and counselat supplementary
jury instructions, and thus their enunciation of a due process right to be present refers to the presence of
parties and counsel in a manner that does not specifically identify the right ofa party to be present as an
independent right. See Arrington v. Robertson, id. at 823. In Filllppon the Supreme Court held:
We entertain no doubt that the orderly conduct of a trial by jury, essential to the proper
protection of the right to be heard, entitles the parties who attend for the purpose to be
present in person or by counsel at all proceedings from the time thejury is impdnelcd until it is
discharged after rendering the verdict.
250 U.S. 76,81 (1919). However, these cases give no indication of an intention to preclude the right ofa
party to be present due to the presence of his counsel, and in fact they are now cited in support of the
proposition that a party is entitled to be present in the courtroom whether or not he is also represented
by counsel. Carlisle v. County of Nassau, 64 App. Div. 2d 15, 19,408 N.Y.S.2d 114,116-17 (1978); 75
AM. JUR. 2d Trial§ 51(1974). Moreover, the weight of recent authority, see cases cited in note 27 iupra,
supports the right of a party to be present in addition to the presence of his counsel.
34. 17 Cal. 3d 908, 923, 553 P.2d 565, 576, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405, 416 (1976).
35. The court's final decision was to allow the prisoner the right to appointed counsel and the
right to personal appearance only if the prisoner's testimony was necessary, a reversal of the position of
the indigent free defendant. Here again the court's determination of the due process rights to be
accorded an indigent prisoner result from a balancing process which takes into account the unique
needs of the prisoner and the risks and added burden of allowing the prisoner to appear.
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public, and parties normally encounter no impediment to their attendance
in person, as well as through their counsel.36 Justice Frankfurter's
exposition on the nature of due process is worthy of note in this context:
"Due process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what is
fair and right and just. The more fundamental the beliefs are the less likely
they are to be explicitly stated. But respect for them is of the very essence of
[due process.], 37
The right of a party to be present in court throughout his civil trial is
just such a right-a fundamental and basic tenet of due process, the denial
of which would subvert the ideals of fairness and justice upon which the
concept of due process rests.
4. Due Process Right of Indigents to Access to Courts
The seminal decision in the line of cases dealing with indigents' due
process right to a meaningful hearing is Boddie v. Connecticut.3 8 In
Boddie, the United States Supreme Court held that due process prohibits a
state from denying access to its courts to individuals seeking marital
dissolutions solely because of their inability to pay court fees and service of
process costs. 39 The Boddie Court refused to decide whether access for all
individuals to the courts is a right that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed
by the due process clause.40 It did, however, hold that the plaintiffs, who
were left no alternative to the judicial system to alter a fundamental
relationship, that is, marriage, were forced into the same position as
defendants called upon to defend their interests in court.4 1 Thus, the Court
reasoned that the due process rights of plaintiffs in Boddie were to be
"resolved in light of the principles enunciated in our due process decisions
that delimit the rights of defendants compelled to litigate their differences
in the judicial forum., 42 Relying in part on decisions such as Windsor v.
Mc Veigh43 and Hovey v. Elliott44 that stand for the principle that "due
process of law signifies a right to be heard in one's defense," the Court held
that, at a minimum, "absent a countervailing state interest of overriding
significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through
36. 88 C.J.S. Trial § 40 (1955).
37. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
38. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
39. In reaching its decision, the Court utilized both the notions of fundamental fairness and a
balancing test, holding that the "[s]tate owes to each individual that process which, in light ofthe values
of a free society, can be characterized as due," id. at 380, but also recognizing that at a minimum due
process required a meaningful opportunity to be heard, absent a cowateriviling state Interest. Id. at
379. The Court assessed the interests put forth by the state for allowing the fee and cost requirement to
bar indigents' access to the courts-the prevention of frivolous litigation, resource allocation, and cost
recoupment-and determined that they did not justify the denial of access to the courts. Id. at 381-82.
40. Id. at 382.
41. Id. at 376-77.
42. Id. at 377.
43. 93 U.S. 274 (1876).
44. 167 U.S. 409 (1897).
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the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard."45
Moreover, the Court found that due process was not satisfied when a cost
requirement, valid on its face, operated to "foreclose a particular party's
opportunity to be heard. '4
Underlying the Court's decision in Boddie was the basic notion that
justice and social order cannot be maintained absent a legal system that
guarantees that one may not be deprived of his rights, either liberty or
property, without due process of law.47 This belief prompted the Court's
concern that denial of a defendant's full access to the judicial process raises
grave questions regarding the legitimacy of the judicial system.48
Although the Supreme Court in two subsequent cases has refused to
extend the Boddie right of access guarantee to indigent plaintiffs in other
types of civil proceedings, the rationale of these later cases in no way
diminishes the recognition made by the Supreme Court in Boddie of the
right of indigent defendants to a meaningful hearing. In United States v.
Kras,49 the Court refused to extend the right of access to indigent plaintiffs
seeking to file a petition in bankruptcy without prepayment of filing fees.
The Court distinguished Boddie on the grounds that it recognized no
fundamental interest in the availability of a discharge in bankruptcy and
that alternative methods were available for the adjustment of a debtor's
legal relationship with his creditors. 50 The Court acknowledged the
recognition in Boddie of the rights guaranteed to civil defendants.
51
However, the availability of alternative remedies to plaintiff debtors
seeking bankruptcy made it impossible for the Court to equate the position
of such plaintiffs with the position of a civil defendant compelled to defend
his interests in court.52 In Ortwein v. Schwab,53 the Supreme Court held
that the Oregon appellate filing fee, as applied to indigents seeking to
appeal an adverse welfare decision, was not violative of the due process
clause. The Court again distinguished Boddie on the dual grounds that no
fundamental interest would be gained or lost depending on the availability
of the relief sought and that alternatives to the judicial remedy not
conditioned on the payment of the fees existed. Both of these observations
by the Court were grounded in its recognition that the appellants had
already received a pretermination evidentiary hearing that met the
minimal requirements of due process as recognized in Goldberg. The
Court emphasized the fact that due process does not require the state to
45. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971).
46. Id. at 380.
47. Id. at 374-75.
48. Id. at 376.
49. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
50. Id. at 444-46.
51. Id. at 444.
52. Id. at 444-46.
53. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
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provide an appellate system. 4 Thus, the situation of appellants in Ortivein
was equally dissimilar to that of a civil defendant who, prior to trial, has
not yet been provided his "meaningful opportunity to be heard.""5
The Supreme Court of California, which decided Jara, has itself
recognized an indigent defendant's due process rights of access to the court
and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in the recent case of Payne v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles." Noting that "[flew liberties in America
have been more zealously guarded than the right to protect one's property
in a court of law,' ,57 Justice Mosk, writing for the majority, found that the
right of an indigent prisoner, as a defendant in a civil case, to protect
property he already owns or may own in the future, was equal in
constitutional significance to the right that was protected in Boddie.58 The
Court in Payne therefore held that an indigent prisoner seeking to defend a
civil suit has a due process right of access to the court that is violated when
a prisoner is deprived of both the right to personal presence in the
courtroom and appointed counsel. 59
In summary, the doctrine of due process guarantees to civil
defendants, at a minimum, a meaningful opportunity to be heard. In
determining what procedural safeguards are necessary to comprise a
meaningful hearing in a given situation, the courts have traditionally
employed the concept of fundamental fairness as a basic component of
their analysis. In addition, the courts have employed as a guide certain
fundamental procedural protections that have been generally recognized
as basic elements of a due process hearing, including the right to cross-
examination and the right of a party to be present at the adjudication. A
balancing approach, weighing the interests of the state against the
individual interests sought to be protected, has also traditionally been
54. Id. at 659-60.
55. The California Supreme Court in Payne v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 17 Cal. 3d 908,
915, 553 P.2d 565, 571, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405, 411 (1976), explicitly recognized that the decisions of
Ortwein and Kras did not alter the impact of Boddie on the rights of civil defendants. The California
court noted that the later opinions were distinguished from Boddie on two grounds. First, the
underlying interests the litigants were seeking were not as constitutionally significant as the dissolution
of marriage. However, the Payne court concluded that a defendant in a civil case seeks not merely the
benefit of a statutory expectancy, as the plaintiffs in K-as and Ortivein, but rather the protection of
property he already owns or may own in the future. To illustrate this difference the California Supreme
Court pointed out that "Congress could permissibly repeal all bankruptcy laws" and "a state legislature
is under no constitutional mandate to provide welfare payments." Absent constitutional amendment,
however, "neither Congress norany state legislature could provide forextensive confiscation ofprivate
property without compensation." Thus, the California Supreme Courtconcluded that "the underlying
right petitioner seeks to protect equals in constitutional significance the right to dissolve a marriage
that was protected in Boddie. Id. at 916, 553 P.2d at 571, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 411. The second major
distinction, that plaintiffs in Krasand Ortwein were not compelled to relysolely on the courts to pursue
their interests, is easily distinguishable from the position of a civil defendant, who has no choice but to
defend his interests in court. Id. at 916-17, 553 P.2d at 572, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
56. Id. at 908, 553 P.2d at 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
57. Id. at 911, 553 P.2d at 568, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
58. Id. at 916, 553 P.2d at 571, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
59. Id. at 923-24, 553 P.2d at 576, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 416. See note 35 mipra.
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utilized as part of a due process analysis. Moreover, the due process right
of access to the courts, guaranteed in Boddie, ensures civil defendants that
their right to a meaningful hearing cannot be denied solely because of their
indigency.
B. Development of Equal Protection Doctrine
The promise of equal protection under the law, given independent
constitutional significance with the adoption of the fourteenth amend-
60ment, is a guarantee "that similar people will be dealt with in a similar
manner"61 by the government and that "people of different circumstances
will not be treated as if they were the same." 62  Governmental
classifications63 challenged on equal protection grounds have traditionally
been judged under two standards of review. 64 In the area of general social
welfare and economic legislation, classifications are subject only to the
rational relationship test, 65 which requires that a classification bear a
rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.6 6 A far more stringent
standard, strict scrutiny, requires proof by the government that the
60. The fourteenth amendment provides in part: "No state shall . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Although the fourteenth amendment applies only to
state and local governments, the United States Supreme Court has declared that classifications made
by the federal government that would violate the equal protection clause will be held to contravene the
due process clause of the fifth amendment. NOWAK, supra note 16, at 518. See, e.g., Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,638 n.2 (1975): "[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection
clause, it does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.' (citations
omitted) This Court's approach to fifth amendment protection claims has always been precisely the
same as to equal protection claims under the fourteenth amendment."
61. NOWAK, supra note 16, at 520, citing Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
62. Id.
63. In order to challenge governmental action on equal protection grounds, one must first
demonstrate that a law classifies persons in some manner. Commentators state that a classification
within a law can be established in one of three ways: first, the law "on its face," or by its own terms may
classify persons for different treatment; second, the law may classify in its application, Le., those
governmental officials who are administering the law are applying it with different degrees of severity to
different groups; and third, the law may be treated as if establishing a classification on its face if in
reality it constitutes a device designed to impose different burdens on different classes of persons.
64. Although the United States Supreme Court has never recognized in a majority opinion the
use of a standard of review other than the rational relationship and strict scrutiny tests, the Court has at
times reviewed classifications based on gender and illegitimacy according to standards which fail
between the two traditional tests, both in terms of the necessity of the government objective and in the
strength of the required relationship between the classification and the government objective, leading
many commentators to postulate the existence of an intermediate test. See, e.g., NOWAK, supra, note
16, at 525-26; Gunther, Forevard: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Cottrt: A Modelfor a
Never Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. I (1972). An example of the application of the intermediate
test can be seen in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), in which the court required that
classifications by gender serve important government objectives which must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives. NOWAK, supra note 16, at 44-45 (Supp. 1978), suggests that the Court
has recently used an intermediate test in the fields of alienage classifications, Foley v. Connelie, 98 S.
Ct. 1067 (1978), and rights involving marriage. See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977), and Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
65. NOWAK, supra note 16, at 524.
66. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,40 (1973). Otherdecisions
have expressed the standard as requiring that the classification have some "reasonable basis." See, e'g.,
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969);
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948).
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classification is necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest.67 Strict scrutiny is invoked to review classifications that are
claimed to involve a"suspect" group 68 or that infringe upon a fundamental
constitutional right.69
In determining whether a right is deemed fundamental for purposes of
equal protection analysis, the answer lies in assessing whether the right is
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. The Supreme
Court has warned that "[ilt is not the province of [the] Court to create
substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws., 70 The Court's role in determining which rights are
to be deemed fundamental is thus not to engage in a determination of the
social or economic importance of a right or to weigh the relative
importance of a right as compared with one deemed fundamental, but
rather to protect from deprivation, infringement, or interference those
fundamental personal rights or liberties71  guaranteed explicitly or
implicitly by the Constitution.72
The United States Supreme Court has not yet recognized those
67. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
68. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). Groups described as suspect have been
characterized as those "discrete and insular minorit[ies] . .. for whom such heightened judicial
solicitude is appropriate." Id. To date, the classifications that have been firmly established as inherently
suspect by a majority of the United States Supreme Court are those based on race, nationality, and
alienage. Id. Each such classification has been found to be based on an immutable characteristic that
bears no relationship to ability to perform or contribute to society and relegates a class to inferior
status. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973). Commentators have observed, however,
that a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, Foley v. Connelie, 98 S. Ct. 1067 (1978),
makes it clear that alienage classifications are not to be reviewed as strictly as the suspect classifications
of race or national origin NowAK, supra note 16, at 65 (Supp. 1978). The Court has repeatedly held that
classifications based on wealth are not deemed suspect and will be reviewed only under the rational
relationship test. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,471 (1977); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973).
69. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
70. Id. at 33. This statement reiterates the message ofJustice Stewart in Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring):
The Court today does not "pick out particular human activities, characterize them as
'fundamental,' and give them added protection . . . ." To the contrary, the Court simply
recognizes, as it must, an established constitutional right, and gives to that right no less
protection than the Constitution itself demands (emphasis in original).
71. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 38 (1973).
72. Id. at 33-34. In support of use of the strict scrutiny test to protect rights implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution, the Court cites Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,447 n.7 (1972), acknowledging
the dictum:
[I]f we were to conclude that the Massachusetts statute impinges upon fundamental freedoms
under Griswold [v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)], the statutory classification would have
to be not merely rationally related to a valid public purpose but necessary to the achievement
of a compelling state interest (emphasis in original).
Id. at 34 n.73.
The Court further observes, id. at 34 nn. 74, 75 & 76, that the constitutional underpinnings of
rights to equal treatment in the voting process can no longer be doubted even though the right to vote in
state elections is nowhere expressly mentioned, citing in support inter alia Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S.
134, 140-44 (1972); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 135, 138-44 (1970); and Kramer v. Union Free
School District, 395 U.S. 621, 625-30 (1969); and that stricter standards of review are appropriately
applied to ordinances affecting first amendment interests, Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley,408 U.S.
92 (1972), and laws infringing upon the right of procreation, implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution
as a right of personal privacy, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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procedural protections guaranteed by the due process clause in civil
adjudications as fundamental rights in the context of an equal protection
analysis.73 While commentators suggest that a series of decisions related to
the criminal justice system support the proposition that the Supreme
Court has in essence recognized a "fundamental right" to fair treatment in
criminal adjudications, 74 similar Supreme Court precedent based on equal
protectioln doctrine is not available to support the arguments of those who
call for recognition of a parallel fundamental right in the civil realm.
75
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court has itself recently recognized
that due process guarantees to civil defendants rise to the level of
fundamental interests under an equal protection analysis. In Payne v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County,76 the California Supreme Court
held that "to be heard in court to defend one's property is a right of
fundamental constitutional dimension; in order to justify granting the
right to one group while denying it to another, the state must show a
compelling state interest. '77 Thus, the court ruled that the denial of access
to an indigent prisoner defendant constituted a prima facie equal
protection violation under both the federal and state constitutions.
In addition to the question of which rights are deemed fundamental,
the U.S. Supreme Court has focused in recent years on whether a
classification does in fact significantly burden the exercise of a
fundamental right and thus merit an increased standard of review. In
Maher v. Roe," the Court avoided the strict standard of review by
73. See note 185 infra.
74. Nowak, Rotunda and Young suggest that, while no single decision of the United States
Supreme Court recognizes in a majority opinion a fundamental right to fair treatment in the criminal
justice system for purposes of equal protection analysis, a series of related decisions, beginning with
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), have established such a fundamental right. NoWAK, supra note
16, at 676-80. See, e.g. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (state cannot dismiss appeals of
indigent criminal defendants with a separate system which did not include representation by counsel
for defendants); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (Griffin rights to equal access to appellate
review not limited to charges punishable by confinement). They suggest that while the Court "has not
guaranteed that all defendants will be able to present their defense or prosecute their appeals with equal
resources, . . . the Court has sought to guarantee a basic level of fair treatment as a fundamental
constitutional right." NOWAK, supra note 16, at 678.
75. TRiNE, supra note 11, at 1008-10, recognizes that the Supreme Court's treatment of equal
access to civil adjudication in Boddie, Ortwein, and Kras severely limits the extent to whieh equal
access can be claimed as a fundamental right under equal protection analysis. He criticizes the Court's
narrow approach and advocates the recognition of equal litigation opportunity as a fundamental right
on the grounds that "the state's rules of contract, and its laws against forcible self-help, make judicial
decision the only lawful mechanism for securing a binding determination against a recalcitrant
opponent in any case." Id. (emphasis in original). This right, he maintains, should not be denied
because of poverty to those who are obliged to rely upon such processes. Tribe's analysis, paralleling
the access cases, focuses upon plaintiff's rights to access, since the Supreme Court has not yet dealt
directly with the civil defendant's rights in an equal protection analysis.
76. 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976).
77. Id. at 919, 553 P.2d at 573, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
78. 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977). The Court in Maher recognized that the right to privacy Included
the right to have an abortion but held that a Connecticut law limiting medicaid payments for abortions
to those "medically necessary" did not impinge upon the fundamental right and did not merit the strict
standard of review. Id. at 471-74. Nowak, et al., in analyzing the Maher opinion, find that the majority
"views the duty of the state onty in terms of inability to create barriers to the exercise of(fundamental]
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distinguishing between direct state interference with a protected activity
and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with
legislative policy. More recently, the Court has observed that "reasonable
regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into [a
fundamental] relationship may legitimately be imposed." 79
A similar approach utilized by the California Supreme Court may
explain its decision in Castro v. State.80 The court reviewed under strict
scrutiny a California constitutional provision that conditioned the
fundamental right to vote upon the ability to read English. This restriction,
as applied to those literate in another language and able to make a certain
demonstration of access to sources of political information, was held
unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The court also held, however, that California was not
required to adopt a bilingual electoral apparatus, determining that the
state interest in maintaining a single language system was substantial and
that such a bilingual system was not necessary in order for the Spanish-
speaking voters to exercise their right to vote.81 Thus, the court clearly
reviewed the provision of a bilingual system under a less strict standard,
apparently due to its determination that the right to vote would not be
significantly infringed by the absence of such a system.
II. THE STATUS OF THE RIGHT TO AN INTERPRETER
The ability of a court to appoint an interpreter to translate the
testimony of a witness when, in the discretion of the trial court, such a need
arises, has long been recognized in this country, both in statutory 2 and
rights .... [Where the state controls the means necessary to the exercise of the right, or to their
protection through litigation, the majority will engage in some redistribution of economic benefits by
allowing indigent persons free access to those governmental 'benefits.' " However, the majority would
not require the state "to equalize the ability to exercise fundamental rights in the private sector for
persons of differing wealth classifications." The position of the dissent, as these commentators view it,
is that "the state is not only required to respect the exercise of fundamental rights but also to facilitate
their exercise within its existing wealth and income reallocation systems." NowAK, supra note 16, at
622-23. Under either view, the Maher decision should not present an impediment to civil defendants
seeking an interpreter on the basis of equal protection, for in this situation the state does control the
means necessary to exercise due process rights in the courtroom.
79. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,386 (1978). The Court cited as the basis ofits observation
its previous decision in Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977), in which the Court upheld the provisions
of the Social Security Act that terminated certain benefits of a disabled person upon marriage.
80. 2 Cal. 3d 223, 466 P.2d 244, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1970).
81. Id. at 242,466 P.2d at 258, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 34. The court noted that it could reasonably be
assumed that voters literate in Spanish could prepare themselves to vote through advance study ofthe
sample ballots with the assistance of others capable of reading and translating them and that such
voters would have access to the translations of ballot provisions and electoral commentaryafforded by
the Spanish news media.
82. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1827, 1828 (West Supp. 1979). In addition, FED. R. Civ. P.43 provides,
in regard to the taking of testimony, that "[tlhe court may appoint an interpreter of its own selection
and may fix his reasonable compensation. The compensation shall be paid out of funds provided by law
or by one or more of the parties as the court may direct, and may be taxed ultimately as costs, in the
discretion of the court."
FED. R. CRIM. P. 28 similarly provides that "[tlhe court may appoint an interpreter of its own
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common law. 3 The right of a non-English-speaking party to the assistance
of an interpreter throughout the course of a trial has been slower to gain
recognition.
The recognition that has been given to the right of a party to the
assistance of an interpreter during the entire course of trial has been largely
limited to the criminal defendant. While there is no express right to an
interpreter provided by the federal constitution, the recently enacted Court
Interpreters Act 4 provides for the appointment of a certified interpreter at
government expense when a defendant's inability to speak English inhibits
his comprehension of the trial or his communication with his attorney or
the judge. Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure similarly
authorizes the court to appoint an interpreter to assist non-English-
speaking defendants and to provide for the interpreter's compensation out
of government funds.85 Federal courts considering the matter in the
criminal context have held that a denial of an interpreter to an indigent is a
denial of due process and the defendant's sixth amendment right to cross-
examination.86 Those decisions holding that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion or deny defendant his constitutional right in failing to
appoint an interpreter are cases in which a determination was made that
there was no need for such an appointment, as when the defendant was
sufficiently fluent in English, 7 or an interpreter wa; present and available
selection and may fix the reasonable compensation of such interpreter. Such compensation shall be
paid out of funds provided by law or by the government, as the Court may direct."
CAL. EvID. CODE § 752 (West 1966) provides as follows:
(a) When a witness is incapable of hearing or understanding the English language so as
to be understood directly by counsel, court, and jury, an interpretor whom he can understand
and who can understand him shall be sworn to interpret for him.
(b) The interpreter may be appointed and compensated as provided in Article 2(commencing with Section 730) of Chapter 3.
83. See, e.g., People v. Holtzclaw, 76 Cal. App. 168, 171,243 1. 894, 896 (1926), in which the
court stated: "In every court there also rests the inherent power to call interpreters for witnesses under
the proper circumstances, and it is, of course, the duty of a court to call an interpreter whenever such
circumstances arise." See also Menella v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 43 Misc. 5, 6, 86 N.Y.S, 930,931(1904); Wise v. Short, 181 N.C. 320, 322, 107 S.E. 134, 136 (1921).
84. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1827, 1828 (West Supp. 1979).
85. The Notes of the Advisory Committee on FED. R. CRIM. P. 28 provide in part:
This new subdivision authorizes the court to appoint and provide for the compensation of
interpreters. General language is used to give discretion to the court to appoint interpreters in
all appropriate situations. Interpreters may be needed to interpret the testimony of non-
English-speaking witnesses or to assist non-English-speaking defendants in understanding
the proceedings or in communicating with assigned counsel.
86. United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 907 (1974);
United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386 (2nd Cir. 1970). See also United States ex rel.
Navarro v. Johnson, 365 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Pa. 1973), in which, in addition to a discussion of the other
constitutional problems, the court alludes to the infringement of the right to counsel when an
interpreter is absent. Id. at 682.
87. Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86 (1907); United States v. Barrios, 457 F.2d 680 (9th Cir.
1972); United States v. Smith, 464 F.2d 194 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1066 (1972); UnIted
States v. Rodriguez, 424 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970); United States v. Sosa,
379 F.2d 525 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 845 (1967). See also Cervantes v. Cox, 350 F,2d 855 (10th
Cir. 1965).
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to defendant,88 or the defendant could afford to provide himself with an
interpreter. 89
Similarly, the majority of the state courts that have considered the
matter have recognized a state and/or federal constitutional right of a
criminal defendant to the assistance of an interpreter at trial, based on
notions of due process9" and the right to confrontation." Those decisions
that fail to recognize such a right as constitutionally guaranteed are older
cases in which the need for an interpreter was not clearly shown. 92 Such
decisions explicitly affirm the principle that when the failure to provide a
defendant an interpreter has hampered the defendant in presenting his
defense, the court must find that he has been denied a fair and impartial
trial. At least one state, New Mexico, has guaranteed in its constitution
that an accused shall have the charge and testimony interpreted to him in a
language that he understands.
93
While much consideration has thus been given to the constitutional
dimensions of the right of a criminal defendant to the assistance of an
interpreter, the corresponding right of a civil defendant has received less
attention from Congress and the courts. The Court Interpreters Ace 4
88. United States v. Valdivieso, 486 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 971 (1974);
United States v. Diaz Berrios, 441 F.2d 1125 (2d Cir. 1971); Tapia-Coronav. United States, 369 F.2d
366 (9th Cir. 1966); Chavira Gonzales v. United States, 314 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1963).
89. United States v. Desist, 384 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1967), aftrd, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
90. State v. Rios, 112 Ariz. 143,539 P.2d 900 (1975); State v. Natividad, Ill Ariz. 191,526 P.2d
730 (1974); Peoplev. Annett, 251 Cal. App. 2d 858, 861-62,59 Cal. Rptr. 888,890(1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1029 (1968) ("Failure of a trial court to appoint an interpreter for a defendant who has
requested one, or whose conduct has made it obvious to the court thathe is unable because of linguistic
difficulties knowingly to participate in waiving his rights, is 'fundamentally unfair' and requires reversal
of a conviction."); In re Mauriviov, 192 Cal. App. 2d 604, 13 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1961); State v. Faafiti, 54
Haw. 637, 638, 513 P.2d 697, 699 (1973) (court found no need for interpreter in particular case but
stated: "It is general law that where a defendant cannot understand and speak English, the judge is
required to appoint an interpreter to aid a defendant. Otherwise, a trial held in his presence would be
meaningless to him and would violate our concept of due process, as he would not be given his day in
court."); Parra v. Page, 430 P.2d 834 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967). See Exparte Cannis, 83 Okla. Crim.
113, 173 P.2d 586 (1946).
91. Terry v. State, 21 Ala. App. 100, 105 So. 386 (1925) (court held Alabama constitutional right
to confrontation would be meaningless to deaf-mute defendant unless the court provided the necessary
means to communicate to accused the nature of the charge and testing of the witnesses); State v. Rios,
112 Ariz. 143, 539 P.2d 900 (1975); State v. Natividad, 111 Ariz. 191,526 P.2d 730 (1974); Garcia v.
State, 151 Tex. Crim. 593, 210 S.W.2d 574 (1948). See State v. Vasquez, 101 Utah 444, 121 P.2d 903
(1942).
92. Escobar v. State, 30 Ariz. 159,245 P. 356 (1926) (court noted defendant's counsel understood
testimony and presumed defendant's counsel would fulfill his duty to communicate the evidence to his
client); Republic of Hawaiiv. Yamane, 12 Haw. 189 (1899);The Kingv. Ah Har,7 Haw.319 (1888)(In
both cases the Hawaiian court held that defendant had waived any right to an interpreter by failure to
request one and that defendant's counsel could communicate the evidence to him); Zunago v. State, 63
Tex. Crim. 58, 138 S.W. 713 (1911) (defendant did not request interpreter until after testimonywas in,
but court held that if request had been timely made, the court would and should have appointed an
interpreter); State v. Karumai, 101 Utah 592, 126 P.2d 1047 (1942) (defendant had free interpreterat
last of two trials; no request for interpreter was made at first trial and defendant understood English
fairly well). See Markiewiczv. State, 109 Neb. 514,191 NW 648 (1922) (interpreterwas present toassist
defendant throughout trial). For a review of the cases dealing with the right to an interpreter in a
criminal trial, see Annot. 36 A.L.R.3d 276 (1971).
93. N.M. CoNsT. art 2, § 14. See State v. Cabodi, 18 N.M. 513, 138 P. 262 (1914).
94. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1827, 1828 (West Supp. 1979).
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provides for the appointment of interpreters in civil actions only when they
are initiated by the United States. Furthermore, the Act provides that in
civil actions the judge may, in his discretion, apportion the expense
incident to providing the services of the interpreter between or among the
parties or tax them as costs.
The only reported decision prior to Jara that confronts this problem is
another California case, Gardiana v. Small Claims Court,95 which
considered the issue in the context of small claims proceedings. In
Gardiana the appellate court affirmed the decision of a lower court holding
that non-English-speaking litigants are entitled as a matter of right, free of
charge, to be provided with a qualified interpreter. 96 The appellate court
determined that when qualified volunteer interpreters are unavailable, a
small claims court has inherent power to appoint an interpreter free of
charge to non-English-speaking litigants. The court based its decision on
the common-law principle that every court has the inherent power to
appoint interpreters whenever such a course is necessary to the due
administration of justice, 97 the statutory mandate of California Evidence
Code section 752,9' and basic notions of due process. 99 The appellate court
limited the holding of the lower court only insofar as the court prohibited
its application to nonindigents.'00
III. FACTS AND HOLDING OF Jara
On February 14, 1974, Aurelio Jara was sued in -the Municipal Court
of San Antonio Judicial District by Le Roy Bell for $1,277.09 in property
damages allegedly resulting from an automobile accident occurring on
January 16, 1973. Jara sought assistance from the Southeast Legal Aid
Center and an answer and cross-complaint were subsequently filed on his
behalf.' °'
Jara spoke English slightly, but could communicate effectively only in
Spanish. He supported himself, his wife, three children, and a mother-in-
law on an income from wages totalling $530.00 per month. 02 Alleging
indigency and his inability to speak or understand English, Jara filed a
95. 59 Cal. App. 3d 412, 130 Cal. Rptr. 675 (1976).
96. Id., at 421-25, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 680-83.
97. Id. at 423-24, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 682. See People v. Walker, 69 Cal. App. 475,486,231 P.572,
577 (1924), in which the court noted that, in addition to power conferred by statute, courts of general
jurisdiction had inherent power to swear interpreters, whenever necessary to due administration of
justice, which might be exercised to supplement existing statutes, the provisions of which did not
extend to all cases in which such a necessity appeared.
98. Gardiana v. Small Claims Court, 59 Cal. App. 3d 412,423, 130 Cal. Rptr. 675, 681 (1976),
See note 82 supra, CAL. EVID. CODE § 752 (West 1966).
99. Gardiana v. Small Claims Court, 59 Cal. App. 3d 412,422-24, 130 Cal. Rptr. 675, 681-82
(1976).
100. Id. at 425, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
101. Jara v. Municipal Court, 137 Cal. Rptr. 533, 534 (App. 1977), rev'd, 21 Cal, 3d 181,578
P.2d 94, 145 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 833 (1979).
102. Brief for Appellant at 2, Jam v. Municipal Court, 137 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1977), rev'd 21 Cal,
3d 181, 578 P.2d 94, 145 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 833 (1979).
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motion requesting the court to appoint at state expense an interpreter to
assist him in the upcoming trial. The municipal court denied this motion
on the ground that the court had no inherent or statutory power to appoint
an interpreter at the expense of Los Angeles County. Jara subsequently
filed a writ of mandamus to compel the municipal court to provide the
requested interpreter. The superior court denied the motion, concluding
that Jara did not have a common-law right to an interpreter and that
refusal to appoint an interpreter for an indigent litigant in a civil case did
not constitute an abuse of discretion or a denial of either due process or
equal protection. °3 This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals,
which held:
[I]n a civil action, if the defendant is indigent and does not speak or
understand English, and irrespective of whether he is, or is not, represented
by counsel, and, if represented by counsel, irrespective of whether counsel
speaks and understands English only, the due process and equal protection
provisions of the federal and state Constitutions require, in order for such
defendant to have meaningful opportunity to be heard and defend, that an
interpreter be appointed for him at public expense.1°4
The California Supreme Court, over a strong dissent by Justice
Tobriner, voted 4-3 to reverse the appellate court and to affirm the decision
of the superior court denying Jara the assistance of a court appointed
interpreter at the expense of the county. Justice Clark, writing for the
majority, first determined that no statutory basis existed for appointment
of an interpreter at public expense to assist non-English-speaking
litigants.'0 5 The majority then concluded that there was no need for the
court to exercise its inherent power by appointing interpreters at public
expense because language assistance to indigent litigants represented by
counsel appeared to be available. 10 6
The court dismissed in cursory fashion the arguments that due process
and equal protection require the appointment of interpreters at state
expense for indigent civil defendants. The majority recognized that the
right to a "meaningful opportunity to be heard" was guaranteed to
indigent civil litigants by the United States Supreme Court in Boddie. They
determined, however, that access to the court was not constitutionally
impaired when an indigent had alternative means other than resort to the
trial court to secure the relief sought. 0 7 Although no factual basis was
103. Jarav. Municipal Court, 21 Cal. 3d 181,183,578 P.2d 94,95,145 Cal. Rptr. 847,848 (1978),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 833 (1979); Jam v. Municipal Court, 137 Cal. Rptr. 533, 534 (App. 1977).
104. Jam v. Municipal Court, 137 Cal. Rptr. 533, 542 (App. 1977) (emphasis in original).
105. Jarav. Municipal Court,21 Cal. 3d 181,183,578 P.2d 94,95,145 Cal. Rptr. 847, 848 (1978),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 833 (1979).
106. Id. at 184-85, 578 P.2d at 95-96, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 848-49. This article will not address the
statutory issues presented by this case, nor will it examine the arguments presented byJara dealing with
the inherent power of the court, except as they may relate to the constitutional issues presented in the
case. Both issues rely upon California statutory and common law and are therefore of less value in
establishing general recognition of the right to an interpreter in a civil trial.
107. Id. at 186, 578 P.2d at 96-97, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 849-50.
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given to support the conclusion,'0 8 the majority suggested that alternative
means of obtaining language assistance is ordinarily available to the non-
English-speaking litigants. The majority further concluded that because
court proceedings are controlled by counsel, Jara was "in no worse
position than the numerous represented litigants who elect not to be
present in court at all."' 09
IV. THE CASE FOR RECOGNITION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT OF AN INDIGENT CIVIL DEFENDANT
TO THE ASSISTANCE OF AN INTERPRETER
A. The Right of an Interpreter-A Requirement of Due Process
It is now well established that, at a minimum, the doctrine of
procedural due process guarantees a civil defendant a constitutional right
to a meaningful opportunity to be heard-a right that cannot be denied a
defendant solely on the basis of his indigency."10 To decide whether
procedural due process compels the provision of interpreters to indigent
civil defendants at state expense, the basic issue that must be resolved is
whether a meaningful opportunity to be heard is denied to a non-English-
speaking defendant who is deprived of the right to the assistance of an
interpreter at trial. The methods of analysis traditionally employed by the
courts to determine the procedural safeguards necessary to comprise a
meaningful hearing in a given situation afford an appropriate conceptual
framework to resolve this question. Accordingly, a due process analysis of
the right to an interpreter properly commences with an examination of the
concept of fundamental fairness as it relates to the defendant's need for an
interpreter. Such an analysis must also probe the relationship between the
provision of an interpreter and those basic procedural safeguards most
directly affected by the absence of such a protection-the right of cross-
examination and the right of a party to be present. Finally, questions of
108. Id. at 184-86, 578 P.2d at 95-97, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 848-50.
109. Id. at 186, 578 P.2d at 97, 145 Cal..Rptr. at 850.
110. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,377 (1971). See notes 38-55 supra and accompanying
text.
Many of the arguments presented throughout this article in support of the right of a civil
defendant to an interpreter focus on the preservation of fairness, reliability and equality in thejudicial
process and, as such, would equally support recognition of the right of indigent civil plaintiffs to the
services of an interpreter. While the author would advocate that these ideals, which lie at the core of due
process and equal protection doctrine, would support the extension of this right to civil plaintiffs, that
issue will not be addressed in this case comment for two reasons. First, the issue is somewhat outside the
scope of the Jara decision. More important, however, is a desire to avoid the implication that the two
issues are interchangeable, thereby leading a reader to believe that a defendant's right to an interpreter
hinges on recognition of a similar right for plaintiffs. While the decisions of Ortwein and Kras indicato
that an extension of current due process and equal protection doctrine is required for recognition of it
constitutional right of plaintiffs to the assistance of interpreters, it is the author's position that current
due process doctrine, especiafly in light of the recognition in Boddie of the rights of indigent
defendants, requires no extension to sustain the right of an indigent defendant, who has no alternative
to the judicial process, to an interpreter to assist him at trial. Moreover, the interests of plaintiffs, when
weighed in the due process balancing test, may not counterbalance the interests of the state as decisively
as do those of indigent civil defendants.
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policy and the competing interests of the defendant and the state must be
examined and weighed through application of the Eldridge'" formula, a
synthesis of the balancing approach traditionally employed by the courts
in resolving procedural due process issues.
1. Traditional Guarantees of Procedural Due Process
a. Fundamental Fairness
The contrariety of the denial of an interpreter and the provision of a
fair hearing has been fully recognized by those state and federal courts that
have considered the right to an interpreter at state expense, both in civil
and in criminal proceedings.
Reported judicial treatment of the issue in a civil context prior to Jara
is limited to the decision of a California appellate court in Gardiana v.
Small Claims Court. 12 Though the court in Gardiana did not rest its
decision directly upon constitutional grounds, 1 3 its holding that an
interpreter must be made available to indigent non-English-speaking
defendants was based in part upon the belief that a contrary ruling "would
have the 'practical effect of restricting an indigent's access to the courts
because of his poverty [and would contravene] thefundamentalnotions of
equality andfairness which since the earliest days of the common law have
found expression in the right to proceed informapauperis.' '114 The court
identified as one of its maj or concerns the fact that to litigants "summoned
to appear as defendants before a judicial tribunal whose proceedings are
conducted in a language they can neither speak nor understand, these
proceedings would be meaningless at best."' 15 While the court in Gardiana
examined the right to an interpreter in the context of a small claims
proceeding, these broader concerns addressed by the court are equally
applicable in a municipal court trial. 116 Although the presence of an
111. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
112. 59 Cal. App. 3d 412, 130 Cal. Rptr. 675 (1976).
113. The appellate court in Gardiana grounded its decision upon a statutory interpretation of
CAL. EVID. CODE § 752 (West 1966) that, if correct, would be germane only to the peculiar mode of
proceedings in a small claims court, and upon the inherent power of the court to appoint an interpreter
when necessary for the due administration of justice.
114. Gardiana v. Small Claims Court, 59 Cal. App. 3d 412,424, 130 Cal. Rptr. 675,682(1976)
(emphasis added), citing Isrin v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 2d 153, 165,403 P.2d 728,736,45 Cal. Rptr.
320, 328 (1965).
115. Gardiana v. Small Claims Court, 59 Cal. App. 3d 412,423, 130 Cal. Rptr. 675,681(1976).
116. The majority in Jara briefly examined the Gardiana decision in the context ofits discussion
of the inherent power of the court, but determined that its precedential value was limited to small
claims proceedings in which attorneys play no role. Jara v. Municipal Court, 21 Cal. 3d 181, 185,578
P.2d 94,96, 145 Cal. Rptr. 847, 849 (1978). While it is truethat the absence ofinterpreters hasa special
significance in the operation of a small claims court, in which the parties must present their own
defense, the concerns of the Gardiana court went beyond the mere ability of the court to function. As
indicated above, the appellate court addressed broader concerns about the fairness of the proceedings
and the meaninglessness of the proceedings to the non-English-speaking defendants, concerns that
would not be completely remedied by the presence of an attorney. The expression of these broader
concerns by the Gardiana court was ignored by the majority in Jara. Similarly, the majority in Jata
failed to address the broader implications of its decision for unrepresented indigent defendants who,
like small claims defendants, bear the entire burden of presenting their defense, but for whom the risk
of potential loss may be far greater.
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attorney provides added protection to a civil defendant, it will not alter his
lack of comprehension." 7 Furthermore, viewing the issue in its broader
perspective, it should be remembered that the right to an attorney for an
indigent defendant in a civil trial has not yet been generally recognized."i8
Therefore, it is possible that civil defendants may find themselves in the
same position as the defendant in a California small claims proceeding,
confronted with total responsibility for presenting their own defense, but
subject to far greater potential losses.
In criminal actions, many courts have explicitly recognized a
constitutional right to the assistance of an interpreter predicated upon the
guarantee of fundamental fairness afforded by the due process clause. In
United States ex rel Negron v. New York," 9 the first federal case to
recognize a constitutional duty on the part of the court to provide an
indigent defendant with a qualified interpreter, this concern was vividly
expressed:
[A]s a matter of simple humaneness, Negron deserved more than to sit in total
incomprehension as the trial proceeded. Particularly inappropriate in this
nation where many languages are spoken is a callousness to the crippling
language handicap of a newcomer to its shores, whose life and freedom, the
state by its criminal processes chose to put in jeopardy. 120
More recently, in United States v. Carrion,'21 the First Circuit expressed
similar regard for the fairness of the proceedings: "The right to an
interpreter rests most fundamentally, however, on the notion that no
defendant should face the Kafkaesque spectre of an incomprehensible
ritual which may terminate in punishment."'22 Many of the state courts
that have recognized a constitutional right to an interpreter have similarly
based their opinion, in whole or part, upon the due process guarantee of
fundamental fairness. 23
117. Even if defendant's attorney is bilingual, she will rarely be able to provide her client with a
simultaneous translation of the hearing and properly fulfill her normal courtroom duties. In State v,
Rios, 112 Ariz. 143, 144,539 P.2d 900,901 (1975), the Supreme Court ofArizona recognized that even
if the defense counsel spoke Spanish, the need for the assistance of an interpreter was not remedied:
The fact that the defense counsel was able to speak Spanish does not negate the fact that the
appellants were denied an interpreter. For defense counsel to cross-examine witnesses, listen
attentively to testimony and objections of the prosecuting attorney and hear rulings and
remarks of the presiding judge and simultaneously render an accurate and complete
translation to his three clients is an impossible task.
See Chang & Araujo, Interpreters for the Defense: Due Process for the Non-English-Speaking
Defendant, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 801, 822 (1975).
118. A constitutional right to appointed counsel has not yet been recognized by the Supreme
Court. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 553. The author does not advocate that the right to an attorney should
not be recognized in civil cases nor suggest that guaranteeing the right to an interpreter diminishes an
indigent's need for an attorney. The point is merely that distinguishing Gardiana on the grounds that
parties are unrepresented in small claims court may not be a valid distinction.
119. 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970). The court in Negron stated as its primary focus the fact that
"Negron's trial lacked the basic and fundamental fairness required by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 389.
120. Id. at 390.
121. 488 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 907 (1974),
122. Id. at 14.
123. See note 90 supra.
[Vol. 40: 663
RIGHT TO INTERPRETER
Such concern for fundamental fairness and "simple humaneness"
should not be limited to the realm of criminal adjudications. Though
deprivation of life or liberty interests has received paramount considera-
tion by the courts, substantial recognition has been given to the
importance of protecting property interests with due process procedural
safeguards. 124 Certainly, since potential property losses could cause
serious deprivation to an indigent defendant and his family, an analogy to
due process concerns for fairness in criminal adjudications is appropriate
in examining the constitutional grounds supporting the right of an
indigent civil defendant to an interpreter. 25 It is no less unjust to allow a
civil defendant to sit uncomprehending through an entire trial while judge
and jury decide how much of his meager income should go to right the
wrong of which he is accused. Justice Tobriner perceived the gravity of the
civil defendant's plight when, writing for the dissenting justices in Jara, he
said:
I cannot agree with the majority's assessment of the confusion, the despair,
and the cynicism suffered by those who in intellectual isolation must stand by
as their possessions and dignity are stripped from them by a Kafkaesque
ritual deemed by the majority to constitute, nonetheless, a fair trial.'26
b. Right of Cross-Examination
The vitiation of effective cross-examination brought about by the
absence of an interpreter to assist a defendant has been repeatedly
recognized by both federal and state courts in criminal adjudications. In
Negron the Second Circuit clearly articulated this concern as an integral
part of its rationale:
However astute [the interpreter's] summaries may have been, they could not
do service as a means by which Negron could understand the precise nature of
124. See, e.g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601(1975)1Goldbergv.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337,342 (1969) ("Where the
taking of one's property is so obvious, it needs no extended argument to conclude that absent notice
and a prior hearing (citation omitted) this prejudgment garnishment procedure violates the
fundamental principles of due process."); Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Covey v. Town
of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
It should also be remembered that in some types of civil actions, such as suits for nonsupport,
liberty interests as well as property interests may be at stake.
125. Throughout this article, analogies are drawn between the recognition of a right to an
interpreter in criminal actions and the need for similar recognition of that right in civil proceedings.
This analytical approach is not meant to suggest that parties must always be guaranteed identical
procedural rights in criminal and civil adjudications. Clearly, the recognition of the procedural rights
of parties in the two systems has received quite different treatment since the inception of our
Constitution and throughout the development of ourjudicial system. Moreover, application ofthedue
process balancing test in various criminal and civil actions may dictate that different procedures are
warranted due to the particular interests of the state and the other parties involved in each action.
Nevertheless, the analogy seems appropriate in the present context because the constitutional rights
that form the nexus for recognition of a right to an interpreter in a criminal action-fundamental
fairness, cross-examination, and the right of a party to be present at trial-guaranteed to criminal
defendants by the fifth and sixth amendments, are also rights that have been constitutionally
guaranteed to civil defendants through the due process clause. Therefore, the recognition that
satisfaction of these rights in a criminal proceeding necessitates the appointment of an interpreter
merits consideration in determining whether due process requires recognition of the right to an
interpreter in a civil adjudication.
126. 21 Cal 3d at 188, 578 P.2d at 98, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 851 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
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the testimony against him during that period of the trial's progress when the
state chose to bring it forth. Negron's incapacity to respond to specific
testimony would inevitably hamper the capacity of his counsel to conduct
effective cross-examination.
127
Many of the state court decisions recognizing a right of a criminal
defendant to the services of an interpreter also base this right upon a state
and/or federal constitutional guarantee of the right of confrontation and
cross-examination. 28 Typical of these decisions is State v. Natividad,29 in
which the Arizona Supreme Court expressed its concern in the following
manner:
The inability of a defendant to understand the proceedings would be not only
fundamentally unfair but particularly inappropriate in a state where a
significant minority of the population is burdened with the handicap of being
unable to effectively communicate in our national language. A defendant's
inability to spontaneously understand testimony being given would
undoubtedly limit his attorney's effectiveness, especially on cross-
examination. 130
Concern about the impairment of cross-examination in criminal
adjudications is grounded in sixth avendment13 1 and corresponding state
constitutional guarantees. In civil adjudications the right to cross-
examination finds its constitutional nexus in the due process clause. As
discussed above, the right of cross-examination has been repeatedly
identified by the U.S. Supreme Court as a basic requisite of a due process
hearing. 33 Recognition of the right of cross-examination as a fundamental
due process safeguard is warranted by the fact that the same basic concerns
that underlie the sixth amendment guarantee of cross-examination in
criminal adjudications-fairness 34 and reliability of the fact-finding
procesS135-are equally significant in civil adjudications. Effective cross-
examination is no less hampered in a civil trial than in a criminal trial when
an indigent defendant is unable to understand the testimony of witnesses
127. 434 F.2d at 389-90. The First Circuit in Carrion v. United States, 488 F.2d at 14, similarly
recognized that "the right to confront witnesses would be meaningless if the accused could not
understand their testimony and the effectiveness of cross examination would be severely hampered,"
128. See note 91 supra.
129. 111 Ariz. 191, 526 P.2d 730 (1974).
130. Id. at 194, 526 P.2d at 733.
131. The sixth amendment provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him."
132. See notes 21-26 and accompanying text supra.
133. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,270 (1970). See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,488-89
(1972); Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
134. In United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d at 389, the Second Circuit declared,
It is axiomatic that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a right to be confronted with adverse
witnesses, now also applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. (citations
omitted) includes the right to cross-examine those witnesses as an "essential and fundamental
requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal."
(quoting in part Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965)).
135 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
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or to communicate effectively with his attorney. For this reason, the
determinations by federal and state courts that the sixth amendment
guarantee of cross-examination dictates a corresponding constitutional
right to an interpreter are persuasive precedent for the recognition of a
constitutional right to the assistance of an interpreter for an indigent civil
defendant predicated upon the requisites of procedural due process. 13
6
c. Right to Be Present
Consideration of the relationship between the right to the assistance
of an interpreter and the right to cross-examination has led some courts to
consider the corresponding right of a party to be present at his trial and the
infringement of that right by denial of an interpreter's services. In Negron,
the Second Circuit incorporated the violation of the right to be present as
part of its rationale:
Considerations of fairness, the integrity of the fact-finding process, and the
potency of our adversary system of justice forbid that the state should
prosecute a defendant who is not present at his own trial, [Lewis v. United
States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892)], unless by his conduct he waives that right.
[Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 351 (1968)] And it is equally imperative that every
criminal defendant-if the right to be present is to have meaning-possess
"sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding." [Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1962) (per
curiam)] Otherwise, "[t]he adjudication loses its character as a reasoned
interaction . . . and becomes an invective against an insensible object."
Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L. REV. 454, 458 (1969). 37
At least one state court has similarly recognized that failure to provide an
interpreter to an indigent non-English-speaking defendant in a criminal
action may infringe upon "the accused's basic 'right to be present in the
courtroom at every stage of his trial.' ,,3 The court noted that "[i]t would
be as though a defendant were forced to observe the proceedings from a
soundproof booth or seated out of hearing at the rear of the courtroom,
being able to observe but not comprehend the criminal processes whereby
the state had put his freedom in jeopardy."'139
It is generally recognized that the right to be present during trial is
guaranteed to a party in a civil action as a requisite of procedural due
process 140 Certainly, the underlying concerns that support such a right in
136. Recognition of the right to an interpreter as a fundamental requisite of due process would
not bestow upon this safeguard the status of an absolute guarantee that the right to an interpreter has
attained (when necessity is demonstrated) in criminal adjudications, as a result of its derivation from
the sixth amendment. Rather, it still would be subject to the interest balancing that determines in each
particular case which due process safeguards will be afforded. See notes 8 and 25 supra.
137. 434 F.2d at 389 (citation and footnote omitted).
138. State v. Natividad, 111 Ariz. 191, 194, 526 P.2d 730, 733 (1974), citing Lcwis v. United
States, 146 U.S. 376 (1892).
139. 111 Ariz. at 194, 526 P.2d at 733.
140. See notes 27-37 and accompanying text supra fora discussion of the recognition of the right
of a party to be present in a civil adjudication.
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criminal proceedings-"fairness, the integrity of the fact-finding process,
and the potency of our adversary system of justice"-are equally
significant in civil adjudications, especially those in which defendants may
be subject to substantial liability. Therefore, those decisions that recognize
the relationship between the right of a party to be present during a criminal
proceeding and the consequent need for the services of an interpreter to
preserve that right may appropriately be given weight in determining
whether procedural due process requires the appointment of an interpreter
in civil adjudications.
2. A Balancing of Interests-Application
of the Eldridge Formula
Procedural due process is a fluid doctrine, prescribing general
principles and recognizing certain fundamental safeguards, but providing
that the identification of the procedural protections required in each
particular case to afford a meaningful hearing will vary with the subject
matter and competing interests in each situation. 41 As has been
discussed, 142 in Mathews v. Eldridge,143 the Supreme Court set forth a
general formula integrating the factors traditionally considered by courts
in balancing the interests of the individual and the state to determine the
form of hearing required in each particular case. While there is controversy
regarding whether the balancing test has become too utilitarian, thereby
eroding the fundamental values upon which due process rests, 144 the
Eldridge formula nevertheless represents the current approach of the
courts in resolving the question of what process is due,145 and thus merits
attention in deciding whether the provision of an interpreter is a requisite
of a meaningful hearing.
a. Interests of the Civil Defendant
The first factor propounded in the Eldridge formula is the private
interest that will be affected by the official action. 4 6 Jara's case provides an
excellent illustration of the significance of the interests of an indigent
defendant in a civil adjudication. An unfavorable verdict could have
imposed upon Jara a debt equal to one-fifth of his annual income of
$6,360.00, which served to support six people. Although California's
garnishment laws are fairly liberal in their protection ofjudgment debtors,
loss of any portion of Jara's wages could subject him and his family to
141. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
142. See notes 14-17 and accompanying text supra.
143. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
144. SeeMashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Administrative Adjudlicatlon
in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Cim. L. REV. 28, 30 (1976).
See also Pollack, Natural Rights: Conflict and Consequences, 27 O111o ST. L.J. 559, 573-80 (1966).
145. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
146. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
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increased deprivation.1 47 In addition, execution of the judgment could
cause loss of personal property not exempt, 148 including his means of
transportation to and from work,1 49 or even cause him to lose his job.'50
Property Jara may acquire in the future is similarly subject to the threat of
execution.1 51 Property interests of other defendants may be more severely
threatened by exposure to much larger judgments or to execution under
garnishment and attachment statutes that do not provide the protections
for indigents contained in the California statutes.152 The significance of an
indigent's interests in obtaining due process protections prior to
garnishment was fully recognized by the Supreme Court in Sniadich v.
Family Finance Corp.,53 in which the Court commented:
For a poor man-and whoever heard of the wage of the affluent being
attached?-to lose part of his salary often means his family will go without the
essentials. No man sits by while his family goes hungry or without heat. He
either files for consumer bankruptcy and tries to begin again, orjust quits his
job and goes on relief. Where is the equity, the common sense of such a
process?'
In addition to financial loss, defendants may be subject to stigmatization as
a poor credit risk while occupying the status of a judgment debtor.
Beyond the financial interests of a civil defendant and his family,
recognition must be given to the importance of treating a defendant with
147. Without filing for an exemption, one-half of the debtor's earnings, or such greater portion
as is allowed by federal statute, received for his personal services rendered at any time within 30 days
next preceeding the date of a withholding by an employer served with a writ of execution, is
automatically exempt from execution. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 690.6 (West Supp. 1979).
See 15 USCS 1673 [1976], which ordinarily raises such exemption to 75% of the debtor's
earnings by providing that the maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an
individual for any work week that is subjected to garnishment may not exceed 25% of his
disposable earnings for that week, or the amount by which his disposable earnings for that
week exceeds 30 times the federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by 29 USCS206(aXI)
in effect at the time the earnings are payable, whichever is less."
30 CAL. JUR. 3d, Enforcement of Judgmnents§ 33, at 59-60 n.26. In addition, all of the debtor's earnings
received for personal services at any time within 30 days next preeeding the date of a withholding by
the employer is exempt if necessary for the use of the debtor or the debtor's family residing in California
and supported in whole or in part by the debtor, providing the debtor files forsuch exemptions and thejudgment is not for certain debts incurred by the debtor or his family for common necessaries or for
personal services rendered by a present or former employer of the debtor. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 690.6 (West Supp. 1979).
148. 146 CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 682 (West Supp. 1979).
149. If an automobile owned by the debtor meets certain qualifications and its value exceeds the
total of S500, the liens and encumbrances upon it and certain fees and costs, it may be subject to
execution. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 690.2 (West Supp. 1979).
150. An employee is only protected by California law from discharge by reason of the fact that
his wages have been subject to garnishment to the extent of garnishment for the payment of onejudgment. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2929 (West Supp. 1979).
151. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 681,685 (West Supp. 1979), provide thatavictorious plaintiffan
enforce ajudgment at any time during the ten years after its entry and even beyond the tenyear period
through the use of supplemental pleadings.
152. See, e.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2329.62 (Page Supp. 1978).
153. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). Sniadadr involved the issue of prejudgment garnishment without prior
hearing or notice.
154. 395 U.S. at 342 n. 9, quoting Congressman Gonzales, 114 CoNG. REc. 1833 (1968).
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dignity and respect throughout the adjudication. The preservation of each
party's dignity and self-respect during the judicial proceedings is one of the
primary functions of procedural due process. 155 To force a person to sit in
total incomprehension while others decide issues vitally important to the
welfare of both the defendant and his family transforms a civil
adjudication into a dehumanizing experience that should not be associated
with the judicial system of a country aspiring to the ideals of justice and
equality. 5
6
b. Reliability of the Fact-Finding Process
The second factor identified in Eldridge as worthy of consideration is
the risk that the procedures used will cause an erroneous deprivation of an
individual's interests. The Jara majority appeared to find this risk minimal,
since it repeatedly emphasized that defendant's counsel controls
courtroom proceedings. Totally ignored were the risks of error created by
the ineffective cross-examination that may result when a defendant is
unable to comprehend the testimony of witnesses and alert his counsel to
unexpected testimony. 157 Further potential for error exists when counsel
and client themselves cannot communicate. 158 These handicaps to effective
cross-examination and communication pose a serious threat to reliable
fact-finding in civil adjudications.5 9 The risk of error is enormously
155. See Mashaw, supra note 144, at 50. Professor Tribe observes that of the two alternative
conceptions of the primary purpose of procedural due process, the first focuses on the concept of
individual dignity:
One approach begins with the proposition that there is intrinsic value in the due process right
to be heard, since it grants to the individuals or groups against whom government decisions
operate the chance to participate in the processes by which those decisions are made, an
opportunity that expresses their dignity as persons. From this perspective, the hearing may be
considered both as a "mode of politics," and as an expression of the rule of law, regarded here
as the antithesis of power wielded without accountability to those on whom it focuses,
Whatever its outcome, such a hearing represents a valued human interaction in which the
affected person experiences at least the satisfaction of participating in the decision that vitally
concerns her, and perhaps the separate satisfaction of receiving an explanation of why the
decision is being made in a certain way. Both the right to be heard from, and the right to be
told why, are analytically distinct from the right to secure a different outcome; these rights to
interchange express the elementary idea that to be aperson, rather than a thing, is at least to
be consulted about what is done with one. Justice Frankfurter captured part of this sense of
procedural justice when he wrote that the "validity and moral authority of a conclusion
largely depend on the mode by which it was reached. . . . No better instrument has been
devised for arriving at truth than to give a person injeopardy of serious loss notice of the case
against him and opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way been found for generating the
feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been done." [Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)]. At stake here is not just the much-acclaimed appearance ofjustice but, from a
perspective that treats process as intrinsically insignificant, the very essence of justice.
TRIBE, supra note 1I, at 502-03 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
156. See United States ex rel. Negron, 434 F.2d at 390; Jara v. Municipal Court, 21 Cal, 3d at
188, 578 P.2d at 98, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 851 (dissenting opinion).
157. See notes 127-36 and accompanying text supra.
158. See Safford, No Comprendo: The Non-English Speaking Defendant and the Crhnnal
Process, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 21-22 (1977).
159. See United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d at 389; 5 WIoMORB ON EVmDENCE
§ 1367 (3d ed. 1940), supra note 22.
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increased in cases in which indigent non-English-speaking defendants are
not represented by counsel and effective cross-examination becomes
impossible.
c. Interests of the State
The final factor to be considered according to the Eldridge formula is
the government's interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional procedural requirement would entail and the nature of
the function involved.
Providing interpreters when needed to indigent civil defendants will
be an added expense that the state must shoulder. The extent to which this
expense may be offset by increased efficiency in courtroom proceedings is
difficult to measure.160 Nevertheless, any increased fiscal or administrative
burdens that might result need not be excessive. Justice Tobriner suggested
that a determination could be made by the judge prior to each trial
regarding the need for an interpreter and the availability of qualified
assistance from sources other than the court.161 His suggestion is sound,
and could be implemented at very little extra cost to the state if the
determination was made during the regular course of pre-trial conferences.
In California and other states with similar provisions, there already exists a
judicial mechanism for providing qualified interpreters in criminal
162 o htrials. Expansion of these existing systems to provide for the needs of
civil defendants would significantly diminish the administrative burden of
providing qualified interpreters to indigent civil defendants.
Another aspect of the fiscal considerations is that willingness to rely
solely upon social service agencies to provide qualified interpreters, as was
suggested by the majority in Jara,163 may be robbing Peter to pay Paul.
Where such agencies are themselves partially or totally funded by
government, such a system might cost the state more in the long run
because of higher administrative costs resulting from decreased centraliza-
tion.
The state's interests do not end with fiscal and administrative
concerns. The strengthening of its judicial system, a vital component of
any government, is itself an important objective.164 Thus, the state has a
160. See Supplemental Brief of Appellant, at 20, filed in the Supreme Court of California, L.A.
No. 30,788, Jara v. Municipal Court, 21 Cal. 3d 181, 578 P.2d 94, 145 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1978).
Commentators have also suggested that interpreters might facilitate the conduct ofjudicial business
since, in the absence of an interpreter, frequent recesses may be necessary to work out communication
problems between the client and his attorney or the court. Chang & Araujo, Interpreters for the
Defense: Due Process for the Non-English Speaking Defendant, 63 CAL. L. Rav. 801, 811 (1975).
161. 21 CaL 3d at 187-88, 578 P.2d at 97-98, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 850-51.
162. See, e.g., CAL. Gov. CODE § 26806 (West 1968), § 68560 (West Supp. 1979); Omio REv. CODE
ANN. § 2335.09 (Page 1954).
163. 21 Cal. 3d at 184-86, 578 P.2d at 95-97, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 848-50.
164. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. at 374-75, the Court acknowledged the vital role played
by the judicial system in society:
Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more fundamental than its
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substantial interest in maintaining ajudicial system that is perceived as fair
and just by its citizens. 65 Even if only one segment of the population feels
that its interests will not be protected, the safety and cohesion that a society
receives from an organized judicial system is weakened. Furthermore, the
mistrust created by a system perceived to be depriving even a minority of
sufficient procedural protections will spread to other segments of the
society, wary of the protection their interests will receive. Thus, even the
interests of the state may not be best served in the long run by a decision to
forego necessary procedural protections.
d. A Balancing of Interests in Jara
Although the California Supreme Court in Jara failed to make any
systematic application of the Eldridge formula, one can perceive a
balancing of those interests underlying the court's rationale. The majority,
in a cursory examination of the due process issue, determined that Jara
was not deprived access to the courts because alternative sources were
available to provide the required procedural protection.166 Such a decision
was in effect a conclusion that the interests of the defendant and the
reliability of the fact-finding process were not significantly impaired.
A major flaw in the majority's analysis was the assumption that such
alterhative sources for assistance exist and are readily available to Jara and
other indigent defendants. The majority provided no factual support for
this conclusion. 167 As the dissent points out, the postulates advanced in
support of this contention may be faulty. 68 Nevertheless, even if the
erection and enforcement of a system of rules defining various rights and duties of its
members, enabling them to govern their affairs and definitively settle their differences in an
orderly and predictable manner. Without such a "legal system," social organization and
cohesion are virtually impossible; with the ability to seek regularized resolution of conflicts
individuals are capable of interdependent action that enables them to strive for achievements
without the anxieties that would beset them in a disorganized society ...
165. See Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. at 172 & n.19 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
166. 21 Cal. 3d at 186, 578 P.2d at 96-97, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
167. Id. at 184-86, 578 P.2d at 95-97, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 848-50.
168. The majority speculates that a defendant could receive language assistance from his
community or from private organizations that exist to aid immigrants. Id, Justice Tobriner in his
dissent correctly points out that while such sources for assistance may be available, it is just as likely
that they are not. 21 Cal. 3d at 188,578 P.2d at97-98, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 850-51 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
Members of defendant's community may be the least able to provide qualified interpretation of
complex court proceedings. (Of the Spanish-speaking population of California, sixteen years of age or
over, only 22% have graduated from high school. Appellant's Supplemental Brief in the Supreme
Court of California, supra note 160, at 12. citing UNITED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS: "EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN TIE UNITED STATES, MARCH 1973-74" iv. n,39
(1974) ). Tobriner notes that significant numbers of minority groups whose principal language is not
English were neither born nor educated in this country. It is therefore quite possible that family,
friends, and neighbors are not bilingual. Tobriner further recognized that non-English-speaking
persons in this country tend to come from economically deprived communities. 21 Cal, 3d at 188, 578
P.2d at 98, 145 Cal. App. at 850. Taking off work for the length of a trial, or abandoning other
necessary duties, such as child care, may not be feasible for family members or friends,
The majority supports its assumption that assistance is available from private organizations only
by a citation to Guerrera v. Carlson, 9 Cal. 3d 808, 813, 512 P.2d 833, 836, 109 Cal, Rptr 201, 204
(1973). in which the court took judicial notice of the fact that opportunities were available to obtain
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majority was correct in assuming that many indigent defendants do have
alternative means to obtain the assistance of a qualified interpreter
throughout their trial, such a generalization does not protect the
constitutional rights of those who do not. Individual inquiry in each case to
determine the availability of such resources and court appointment of
qualified interpreters when alternative sources are not available, is the only
means to ensure that each indigent defendant will be provided with the
necessary safeguards to constitute a meaningful hearing.' 69
Though the majority never addressed the state's interests, historical
perspective suggests that fiscal economy was a major concern. The court's
decision in Jara was handed down amid a growing popular revolt against
higher taxes and government spending that climaxed a month later in the
passage of a state constitutional amendment, Proposition 13.17 ° The
anticipated reduction in state revenue and the climate created by the
intense debate over the amendment may have caused the majority to place
inordinate weight upon fiscal concerns in reaching their decision.
B. The Right to An Interpreter-An Equal Protection Analysis
1. The Existence of a Classification
In order to determine whether the doctrine of equal protection is
violated by the failure of the court to appoint interpreters to assist
defendants in civil adjudications, one must first demonstrate the existence
of a classification created by governmental action.17' The requirement that
all judicial proceedings be conducted in English, provided by statute in
California, 72 establishes a basis for recognition of a classification. The
effect of such a provision, combined with the failure to appoint
interpreters, is to create a class of indigent civil defendants who can neither
understand the proceedings in which they must defend their property nor
afford to remedy their handicap. The California appellate court that
decided Jara readily acknowledged the creation of this classification,
observing that
indigent defendants in a civil case who speak and understand English can
understand the oral proceedings against them and, hence, are not denied a
meaningful opportunity to be heard and defend, while an indigent defendant
translations of welfare termination notices. The availability of such a service is obviously no guarantee
that a social service organization could similarly provide interpreters qualified to translate court
proceedings where the time required may be extensive. The resource allocation of such a commitment
far exceeds the services envisioned by the court in Guerrera.
169. The Jara majority also implied that the reliability of the fact-finding process is preserved
because the court proceedings are controlled by counsel This argument is addressed above in notes
116-18 and accompanying text supra.
170. Proposition 13, which added Art. XIII(A) to the California Constitution, was proposed by
Initiative Measure, 1978, and approved by the voters at the primary election held June 6, 1978. The
amendment drastically lowered real property taxes and severely restricted the ability of the state
legislature to raise state taxes in the future.
171. See note 63 supra.
172. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 185 (West 1954).
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who does not speak or understand English and is not provided with an
interpreter is denied such an opportunity.'
2. Review Under Strict Scrutiny
Once a classification is established, it must be subjected to the
appropriate standard of review to determine whether the doctrine of equal
protection has been violated.7 4  The application of the rational
relationship test will not sustain a finding that indigent civil defendants
have been denied equal protection, since the state can easily demonstrate a
legitimate state interest that bears a rational relationship to the denial of
interpreters. 17 For example, fiscal economy and promotion of a unified
language system are both legitimate objectives that are rationally related to
the refusal to provide language assistance at state expense in a court system
conducted solely in English. Therefore, to establish that this classification
violates the right of indigent non-English-speaking defendants to equal
protection, it is necessary to show that the strict scrutiny test is the
appropriate standard of review.
76
As discussed above, 177 strict scrutiny is invoked in two instances, one
of which is to review classifications that discriminate against a suspect
group. Although non-English-speaking persons have not been identified as
a suspect group, classifications that discriminate against this group
effectively discriminate on the suspect grounds of race and national
origin.17 1 Some support for invoking strict scrutiny on this basis ma be
derived from the decision of the Supreme Court in Lau v. Nichols,' 9 in
which the Court held that section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"8'
which bans discrimination "on the ground of race, color, or national
origin" in programs receiving federal financial assistance, was violated by
the failure of the San Francisco school system to provide English language
instruction or other adequate instructional procedures to 1800 students of
173. 137 Cal. Rptr. at 541 (1977) (emphasis in original).
174. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
175. See notes 65-66 and accompanying text supra.
176. When there is no fundamental right or suspect class involved, the Court to date has been
willing to invoke a standard higher than the rational relationship test only in cases involving gender or
illegitimacy. See note 64 supra. The decisions of the Supreme Court applying an intermedtiate standard
of review as yet provide no general formula to determine when this test is appropriate. Since there is no
indication that this standard would be employed to evaluate the type of language discrimination
examined herein, this article will not analyze the denial of interpreters according to the criteria of the
intermediate test. The arguments in such an analysis, however, would parallel those set forth below In
the discussion of the application of the strict scrutiny test. Whether the interests set forth by the state
would be deemed important government objectives, the achievement ofwhich arc substantially related
to the denial of interpreters, is difficult to predict.
177. See notes 68-69 and accompanying text supra.
178. Certainly, logic would dictate that the vast majority of non-English-speaking persons in this
country are either foreign born or children of foreign born parents and a large percentage are members
of racial minorities. See Chang & Araujo, supra note 117, at 808.
179. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
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Chinese ancestry who did not speak English.' 8 ' This line of analysis,
however, may be thwarted by recent Supreme Court decisions holding that
governmental action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it has
a racially disproportionate impact. Proof of racially discriminatory intent
or purpose is now required to establish a violation of the equal protection
clause.182 Such a task would be difficult, if not impossible, in cases
challenging the denial of interpreters in civil actions.183
Strict scrutiny is also mandated when a classification impinges upon a
fundamental right.184 Thus, another basis for the assertion of an equal
protection right to an interpreter is to establish that the due process right to
a meaningful hearing is a fundamental right in the context of an equal
protection analysis. The United States Supreme Court has not yet
recognized those procedural protections guaranteed by the due process
clause in civil adjudications as fundamental rights that invoke strict
scrutiny.1 5 The California Supreme Court, however, in Pajne v. Superior
181. The fact that the Supreme Court included language discrimination under discrimination
based on race, color, or national origin prohibited by § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an act
intended to implement the fourteenth amendment, is certainly evidence that language discrimination
may be viewed by the Court as creating suspect classifications on the basis of race and national origin.
Chang & Araujo,supra note 117, at 808. Two aspects of the case, however, weaken theanalogy in some
respects. The Court in Lau specifically refused to reach the equal protection argument advanced in the
case. 414 U.S. at 566. See Chang & Araujo, supra note 117, at 809, for discussion of this omission.
Secondly, the Court in Lau relies heavily on regulations and guidelines issued by the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare [HEW] implementing the Act that require school systems to rectify
language deficiencies of their students. While the position of HEW that language discrimination must
be regulated to implement the Act is useful support for the policy advocated herein, the enforcement of
the regulations in Lau provided the Court with a clear basis for its decision that obviated the need to
directly address the question whether a language classiffcation constitutes a suspect racial and)or
national origin classification.
182. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252,264-65 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1976). While both of these cases deal with racial
discrimination, there is no indication that this line of analysis would not be equally applicable to
classifications based on national origin.
183. But cf. Castro v. State, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 230-31, 466 P.2d 244, 248-49, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20,24-25
(1970) (court recites history of prejudice and hatred that influenced passage of English literacy
requirements for voting).
184. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
185. See note 73 and accompanying text supra. In United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973),
and Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973), cases involving both equal protection and proceduraldue
process claims, the Court determined that the imposition of a filing fee in bankruptcy actions and state
appellate actions did not violate a fundamental right guaranteed by thedue process clause. As no other
fundamental interests were infringed, and the imposition of the fees did not involve a suspect class, the
Court determined in both cases that the legislation was in the area of social and economic regulation
and should be reviewed under the rational relationship test. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971), where fundamental procedural due process rights were recognized in a civil context, the case
was decided on due process grounds alone.
TRIBE, supra note 11, at 1111, explains Harlan's preference for due process analysis in Boddle over
an equal protection analysis on the basis of a perceived absence of a natural limiting principle in the
equal protection doctrine which focuses on differential treatment of the poor as a class and a fear that
judicial intervention to redress poverty on the basis of equal protection could become wholesale or
unprincipled. Due process analysis is perceived to be better suited to a case-by-case inquiry into the
nature of the particular benefit sought and the circumstances of the particular indigent plaintiff.
The ability to guarantee a right under the due process clause alone, as the Court did in Boddie,
suggests that one reason for the absence of Supreme Court opinions applying equal protection analysis
to procedural rights guaranteed by the due process clause is the lack of necessity forand redundancy of
such an approach.
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Court of Los Angeles County, 1 86 has itself recently recognized that the due
process right to be heard in court to defend one's property is a right of
fundamental constitutional dimension, invoking strict scrutiny when it is
denied. In San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 187 the United States
Supreme Court determined that a right is deemed fundamental for
purposes of equal protection analysis if it is guaranteed, implicitly or
explicitly, by the Constitution. Thus, the fact that the right to a meaningful
hearing to defend one's property interest has long been recognized as
guaranteed by the Constitution 88 supports the ruling of the California
court in Payne.
A successful invocation of the strict scrutiny lest will also require
proof that the exercise of the fundamental right has been significantly
impaired. 89 Thus, an equal protection analysis of the right to an
interpreter is inextricably intertwined with the recognition of a right to an
interpreter as a fundamental guarantee of procedural due process. t9 It is
necessary to establish that the due process right to a meaningful hearing
includes the right of indigent civil defendants to the assistance of an
interpreter before one can assert that this fundamental right has been
impaired. In Jara the majority opinion failed to recognize a due process
right to an interpreter and thus did not even address the equal protection
issue.' 9' Both the dissent'92 and the appellate court, 93 however, did find
that the due process right of access was abridged by the failure of the state
to provide Jara with an interpreter. As a result of this first finding, both
94
186. 17 Cal. 3d 908, 919, 553 P.2d 565, 573, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405, 413 (1976). See note 77 and
accompanying text supra.
187. 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
188. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 & n.3 (1971).
189. See notes 78-81 and accompanying text supra.
As discussed above, note 81 and accompanying text supra, one explanation for the California
Supreme Court's decision in Castro v. State to review the failure to adopt a bilingual electoral
apparatus under a less strict standard may be a determination on its part that the right to vote would
not be significantly infringed by the absence of such a system. The court observed that voters could
prepare themselves to vote through advance study of sample ballots and the Spanish news media, The
absence of an interpreter, however, is not subject to a similar determination, for it cannot be easily
remedied by advance study or other substitute services. See notes 167-69 and accompanying text supra,
190. The relationship between the due process and equal protection claims illustrated here
suggests conceptual difficulties that may arise in recognizing due process protections, which are
determined according to the interests involved in each case, as fundamental rights for the purposes of
equal protection analysis, which focuses on broad classifications. A resolution of all the issues which
affect the general recognition of due process safeguards as fundamental rights, however, is beyond the
scope of this article.
191. Though the majority gives no explanation for its refusal to address the equal protection
issue, the most plausible reason for this omission lies in the fact that the majority's holding that the
defendant was not denied meaningful access to the courts strips the equal protection argument of its
doctrinal underpinning, a fundamental right that would invoke strict scrutiny.
192. 21 Cal. 3d at 193-94, 578 P.2d at 101, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
193. 137 Cal. Rptr. at 541 (App. 1977).
194. Justice Tobriner, in his dissenting opinion, did not make specific reference to equal
protection but rather alluded to it by stating that Jara was denied a fundamental right equal to the
fundamental right denied in Castro v. State, 2 Cal. 3d 223,466 P.2d 244,185 Cal. Rptr. 20(1970), a case
decided on equal protection grounds.
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concluded that denial of an interpreter effectively denied Jara his
fundamental right to a fair and meaningful hearing and thus also
constituted a violation of equal protection.195
Once it has been determined that strict scrutiny is the appropriate
standard of review, the government must demonstrate that the classifica-
tion is necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. 96 InJara
the state asserted three "compelling" state interests: (1) maintaining a
single language system; (2) discouraging frivolous litigation by imposing
costs on all litigants; and (3) holding the maintenance of the courts within
reasonable monetary limits.' 97
The appellate court found that while the state's interest in maintaining
a single language system of English in court proceedings is significant, a
denial of interpreters to indigent defendants was not necessary to promote
that result. The court held that this interest would not be "compromised,
endangered, disturbed or dented to any appreciable degree by the public
expense involved in providing interpreters in civil actions to indigent
defendants who do not understand or speak English."' 98 No argument was
presented that non-English-speaking defendants who can afford their own
interpreters compromise the state's interest in maintaining a single
language system in court proceedings. Thus, it is hard to imagine that
affording indigent defendants that same privilege would significantly
impair this interest. The state in Jara also implied in a brief that denial of
an interpreter would provide non-English-speaking persons incentive to
learn English.' 99 Such an argument is unrealistic. It is highly improbable
195. Professor Charles Thompson of the Ohio State University College of Law suggests that
another fundamental right arguably infringed by the denial of interpreters is the right to petition the
government for the redress of grievances, explicitly guaranteed by the first amendment. The Supreme
Court has recognized that the right to petition extends to all departments of the government and thus
includes the right of access to the courts. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972); California Motor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).
Although the first amendment right to petition the courts has not yet been dealt with by the
Supreme Court as a fundamental right in the context of an equal protection analysis, this may be due to
the fact that first amendment rights are adequately protected by the substantive guarantees of the first
amendment itself, rendering equal protection analysis extraneous. NOwAK, supra note 16, at 675. The
basic right to petition, however, has been acknowledged as a fundamental right. DeJonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353,364-65 (1937) (a substantive due process analysis). The Supreme Court has further laid the
groundwork for an equal protection analysis by holding that classifications affecting first amendment
interests must be reviewed under strict scrutiny. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,99,
101-02 (1972). The more difficult issue is whether denial of an interpreter significantly impairs the right
to petition. As it appears that no guidelines have yet been set to determine the procedural requisites of
the first amendment right to petition the courts, it seems likely that such an analysis would either
parallel the determination of a due process right to access or require only an absolute right to access in
its barest form. Should the right to petition be held to require procedures necessary for a due process
right to access, the equal protection claim to an interpreter would bestronger, since theSupreme Court
has already acknowledged that strict scrutiny will be invoked to protect first amendment interests, a
protection it has not yet recognized for procedural due process rights.
196. See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
197. 137 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
198. Id.
199. Respondent's Brief in the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District,2nd Civil No.49245,
at 10, Jara v. Municipal Court, 137 Cal. Rptr. 533 (App. 1977)
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that an indigent person who does not speak English will attempt to learn
English on the chance that he might one day be named defendant in a civil
suit, or that, once named, he will have enough time to become sufficiently
fluent in the language. 0
The state's second compelling interest, discouraging frivolous
litigation, is specious in the context of civil defendants who are compelled
to become involved in the judicial process. The appellate court in Jara
rejected this argument out of hand.20 1 Moreover, in Boddie the United
States Supreme Court recognized that such a concern is insufficient even to
deter a plaintiff's right of access:
[T]here [is] no necessary connection between a litigant's assets and the
seriousness of his motives in bringing suit. . . . Moreover, other alter-
natives exist to fees and cost requirements as a means for conserving the time
of courts and protecting parties from frivolous litigation, such as penalties for
false pleadings or affidavits, and actions for malicious prosecution or abuse of
process, to mention only a few.202
The third interest asserted by the court is one of fiscal economy. As
discussed above,0 3 the cost of providing interpreters to indigent civil
defendants, when the need is shown, is difficult to estimate. The appellate
court reviewing Jara felt that the cost would be minimal, stating: "We
seriously question the view that the cost of maintaining the court system
will be increased to any appreciable degree if interpreters are provided at
public expense in the limited situation presented in the case at bench.' 204
Moreover, the burden is on the state to show the existence of a compelling
state interest.205 If the cost of interpreters is unknown, it is the state that
has failed to meet its burden. In any event, the U.S. Supreme Court in
200. See Chang & Araujo, supra note 117, at 810.
But cf. Castro v. State, 2 Cal. 3d 223,242,466 P.2d 244,258,85 Cal. Rptr. 20,34 (1970), in which
.he court determined that the "state interest in maintaining a single language system is substanthil" and
that the provision of ballots, notices, and pamphlets in Spanish was not necessary because adequate
alternatives existed for Spanish speaking persons to obtain this infornmation. This decision can be
distinguished from Jara on the grounds that alternative methods to obtain the needed service existed in
Castro, whereas no such showing was made in Jara. Because such alternatives existed, it does not
appear that the question of provision of Spanish ballots, etc., in Castro wa:s subjected to the standard of
strict scrutiny. No finding was made that the interest of maintaining a single language system was
compelling or that denial of the Spanish ballots, etc., was necessary to promote that interest. See also
Guerrero v. Carlson, 9 Cal. 3d 808, 814-16, 512 P.2d 833,837-838,109 Cal. Rptr. 201,205-06 (1973), in
which the Court followed Castro, denying an equal protection claim based on failure to translate
welfare notices. Here again, there was no application of the strict scrutiny standard and alternative
sources to obtain the service were held to be available.
201. 137 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
202. 401 U.S. at 381-82.
The state tried to resurrect this argument in its Supplemental Brief in the Supreme Court, at 9 L.A.
No. 30,788, Jara v. Municipal Court, 21 Cal. 3d 181,578 P.2d 94,145 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1978), by stating
that a favorable decision would lay the groundwork for successful claims to public-funded counsel,
experts and transcripts, which would increase frivolous litigation. Should the courts be willing in the
future to recognize such services as fundamental rights, the Boddie rationale would be equally
applicable in these cases.
203. See note 160 and accompanying text supra.
204. 137 Cal. Rptr. at 541-42.
205. See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
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Shapiro v. Thompson206 held that financial savings cannot justify an
otherwise invidious classification challenged under the doctrine of equal
protection.207 Thus, none of the interests asserted by the state in Jara are
sufficient to pass constitutional muster under the strict scrutiny standard of
review.
V. CONCLUSION
The application of traditional modes of due process analysis
demonstrates that an indigent, non-English-speaking defendant's right of
access in a civil adjudication includes the right to the assistance of a
qualified interpreter, appointed, if necessary, at state expense, to afford
defendant a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The concept of
fundamental fairness, pivotal to any due process analysis, has been
recognized by courts in the context of both civil and criminal proceedings
to compel the provision of an interpreter to indigent defendants, when
need is demonstrated and adequate alternative sources of qualified
assistance appear unavailable. Preservation of fundamental procedural
protections-the right to cross-examination and the right of a party to be
present throughout his trial-further dictates that an interpreter be
provided. Finally, application of the balancing test traditionally employed
to determine what process is due in each case demonstrates that the
exposure of the civil defendant and the defendant's family to potentially
severe deprivation, the preservation of the defendant's dignity, the
reliability of the fact-finding process, and the state's interest in maintaining
the public's respect for and compliance with the judicial system outweigh
any fiscal or administrative burdens which may be imposed. Had the
California Supreme Court in Jara examined the issue in terms of
traditional due process concerns and safeguards, or systematically applied
the balancing test prescribed in Eldridge, each such mode of analysis
would have indicated that Jara was entitled to receive the assistance of a
qualified interpreter throughout his trial, appointed at state expense if a
hearing disclosed that adequate alternative sources were unavailable.
The recognition of the right of an indigent civil defendant to a court-
appointed interpreter as a requirement of equal protection finds less
support in current doctrinal analysis. The lack of proof of discriminatory
intent is likely to deflate an argument focused on discrimination against a
suspect group. Therefore, a successful equal protection claim would most
probably result from the application of the strict scrutiny standard of
review invoked by infringement of a fundamental right. Since the United
States Supreme Court has not yet recognized those procedural protections
guaranteed by the due process clause in civil adjudications as fundamental
206. 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
207. See Payne v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 17 Cal. 3d at920,553 P.2d at 574,132
Cal. Rptr. at 414.
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rights for purposes of equal protection analysis, a decision that denial of
the due process right to access invokes strict scrutiny would require an
extension of current equal protection doctrine. In California, however,
such an extension was not required, since the California Supreme Court
had already recognized that the due process right to a meaningful hearing
was of fundamental constitutional dimension, invoking strict scrutiny
when it is denied. Once this hurdle is overcome, recognition that the due
process right to a meaningful hearing includes the right of indigent civil
defendants to the assistance of an interpreter dictates that strict scrutiny be
applied. The application of the strict scrutiny standard poses no threat to a
defendant's equal protection claim, for the criteria are difficult for the
government to meet. None of the interests asserted by the state in Jara were
sufficient to survive review under this standard. °8
Despite the deficiencies in current equal protection analysis in
supporting a right to an interpreter in a civil trial, it is obvious that the
policy behind the equal protection doctrine would be well-served by
guaranteeing indigent, non-English-speaking defendants such a right. The
promise that "people of different circumstances will not be treated by the
government as if they were the same' 209 can only be kept when indigent
non-English-speaking defendants are guaranteed the assistance of
interpreters to afford them the same opportunity that other defendants
have to comprehend and participate fully in the defense of their interests in
a civil proceeding.
Marianne Brower Blair
208. 137 Cal. Rptr. at 541-42.
209. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
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